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ABSTRACT 
Of all the nuclear arsenals in the world, Pakistan’s faces the most risk.  With over forty 
terrorist organizations active within the country, frequent power fluxes between the military, 
government and intelligence agencies, and a history of security breaches plaguing its nuclear 
program, Pakistan makes North Korea seem secure and stable.  With all the challenges that face 
the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, it still lacks one basic security technology, Permissive 
Action Links (PALs), which are use control devices that make it virtually impossible for any 
unauthorized person to detonate a nuclear weapon.  Over the years, there have been barriers that 
have prevented Pakistan from integrating PALs into their arsenal, regardless of how much they 
will improve safety.  Most of these reasons have revolved around the legality of a technology 
transfer; however, these legal obstructions are simply caused by inefficient rules left over from 
the Cold War.  An investigation shows that these barriers are not insurmountable, and that PAL 
technology could in fact promote a much-needed modernization of international nonproliferation 
law. 
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During the presidential campaign of 2008, Barack Obama unapologetically called for an 
end to the war in Iraq.  Some conservative critics voiced their concern that he would be too timid 
to make tough choices as Commander-in-Chief.  However, President Obama has proven just the 
opposite in his first months in office, particularly in regards to his approach towards Pakistan, 
where he is creating a new strategy connecting the country more closely with the war in 
Afghanistan.i  It is no wonder that the President considers this country a top priority: Pakistan 
houses not only the sworn enemy of the U.S.—Osama bin Laden, but also a nuclear arsenal of 
anywhere between 50 to 120 nuclear weapons.ii 
Keeping nuclear material and technology safe has been an ongoing struggle for decades, 
and has only worsened with time.  The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Illicit 
Trafficking Database lists a total of 1,080 confirmed incidents of illegally trafficked nuclear 
materials documented between 1993 and 2006.iii  Several hundred others remain documented but 
unconfirmed.  Though the large majority of trafficked materials are in small amounts, it is 
possible that the seized materials may have only been samples of larger quantities made available 
for later larger purchases.  In 67% of reported cases, lost or stolen materials are not recovered.iv 
Three years following this study, few effective things have been done to increase the 
safety of American lives from a nuclear attack.  With so much money going toward rebuilding 
Iraq and, now, towards failing economy, many fear that the security of the United States could be 
compromised easily.  Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist Nicholas D. Kristoff commented that 
during the Bush administration, efforts went towards stopping the most peripheral elements of 
the WMD threat, namely Iraq, while ignoring the more central threat of global proliferation.  
Today, the U.S. finds itself more vulnerable to a nuclear attack than even during the Cold War.v  
According to a recent survey by Senator Richard Lugar, the risk of a terrorist attack on a major 
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city is actually increasing over time.vi  But where would these terrorist attacks likely come from?   
Chair Joint Chief of Staff Michael Mullen claims the next terrorist attack on America is 
currently being planned in the “under-governed regions” of Pakistan, where Al Qaeda has made 
its world headquarters.vii  This risk is mainly due to the unstable balance of power within the 
country and the continuing presence of Al Qaeda and other extremists.  Though some argue that 
Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are secure, there is reason for skepticism.   
Matthew Bunn of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard points out that 
nuclear facilities such as those in Pakistan “would not be able to provide a reliable defense 
against attacks as large as terrorists have already proved that they can mount, such as the four 
coordinated, independent teams of four to five suicidal terrorists that struck on September 11, 
2001.”viii  It is not currently known how extensive Al Qaeda’s efforts have gone to procure 
nuclear weapons.  There have been instances of top-level nuclear program officials being 
sympathetic to Al Qaeda.  Pakistani nuclear scientists Sultan Mahmoud and Abdul Majeed 
established a charity to support the Taliban, and later held a now infamous meeting with Osama 
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, during which they discussed nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons.ix  There is a lack of evidence to prove the extent of success Al Qaeda has met 
in its attempts.  Similarly, no evidence exists to prove that there have not been other similar 
meetings.  Nevertheless, it is sobering to remember that a nuclear plot could conceivably be 
planned on the same small scale as the plot for the September 11th attacks, and on the same level 
of secrecy.x  
Bearing these facts in mind, it is desirable for Pakistan to make every possible effort to 
ensure the safety of its nuclear arsenal; however, Pakistani nuclear weapons still lack certain 
important safety technologies—specifically, one of the oldest and most widely accepted tools for 
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nuclear security: Permissive Action Links (PALs).  Most American, British, French, and Russian 
nuclear weapons are equipped with PALs.xi  These use control devices greatly decrease the 
possibility of any unauthorized persons, such as terrorists, being able to set off nuclear weapons.  
The Obama administration must make it a priority to work with Congress in urging the Pakistani 
government to equip its nuclear arsenal with PALs.   
To explore these issues in their full depth, several different elements must be explored.  
First to be investigated will be background of the dangerous conditions within Pakistan in order 
to analyze and better understand the necessity of PAL technology.  This will include an 
assessment of the threats within the country, as well as the threats caused by instability within 
Pakistan’s power structures.  Next to look into will be the particulars of PAL technology and 
assess its potential to provide real safety to a nuclear arsenal such as Pakistan’s.  Following these 
sections, will be a comprehensive review of the arguments for and against Pakistan’s adoption of 
PAL technology, beginning with the U.S. perspectives, followed by the Pakistan perspectives.  
To conclude, a brief policy recommendation will be proposed. 
Risk Assessment: ‘The Most Dangerous Place on Earth’ 
The centers of power within Pakistan are not the only areas that need to be understood; 
the whole country faces substantial challenges as well.  As Capitol Hill newspaper Roll Call’s 
executive editor Mort Kondracke described the situation: “U.S. intelligence officials say Pakistan 
is the likeliest source of terrorist attacks on the United States. It's the most dangerous place on 
earth: nuclear-armed, menaced by terrorists, economically in crisis and mired in political 
turmoil.”xii  The terrorist organizations within Pakistan, difficult even now to count and 
categorize, and are evolving as a new generation emerges.  The area which holds these groups is 
in the northern region of Pakistan, specifically the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and 
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the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).  This rugged terrain is home to many ancient 
tribes and, now, scores of terrorist groups including over one million men who have grown up 
wielding firearms as part of a way of life.  The new generation, with its leadership based on 
jihad, is emerging to make its presence known to the world.  In reaction to Western culture, 
groups have even declared jihad on such things as television and music.xiii  
Although it is impossible to quantify the various groups within these regions, Ashley J. 
Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has managed to sort them into five 
categories: Sectarian, Anti-India, Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda and associates, and the Pakistani 
“Taliban.”xiv  Others, such as the South Asia Intelligence Review, categorize the groups in three 
ways: domestic organization, trans-national organizations, and extremist groups for a total of 
forty seven distinct groups.xv   
Steve Coll, the President of the New America Foundation, described Pakistan’s extremist 
groups as “hard-core breakaway children militias of the sort you encounter in failed states in 
Africa and elsewhere.”xvi  Though hidden away in the steep mountains of Pakistan, they gain 
global fame with their all-too successful attacks.  Al Qaeda is certainly the main target of U.S. 
forces, but other groups are also gaining world renown: Lashka-e-Taiba, an anti-Indian terrorist 
organization, has been linked to the 2008 Mumbai attacks where over 170 people were killed.xvii  
The groups Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have been suspected of being responsible 
for the attacks on the Sri Lankan cricketers in Lahore in 2009.xviii   
To combat the area’s unique challenges, the Pakistani military created the Frontier Corps.  
This paramilitary group has what would seem to be the valuable advantage of knowing the local 
dialects as well as having a familiarity with the rough terrain.  Unfortunately, the military has 
struggled to secure the loyalty of the Frontier Corps.  Members of this group have frequently 
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refused to follow orders and fight.  They are inadequately trained and equipped for counter-
insurgency attacks.xix  The greatest problem does not lie simply in lack of training; another 
concern is that in the 1990s, the Corps was involved in training the Taliban, and is suspected to 
still have strong ties to that organization.  They are also considered to hold deep sympathies for 
local militants, and are afraid of creating conflict which might backfire on themselves or their 
own families.xx  Although the Frontier Corps hold the essential knowledge of the culture and 
land, it will take years, not months, to transform them into a useful weapon against Pakistan’s 
terrorist groups. Meanwhile, these groups enjoy an autonomy that allows them to plot further 
attacks. 
Pakistan: Military, Intelligence, Political Background and Recent History 
A mere list of terrorist organizations may be enough to make U.S. intelligence analysts 
lose sleep, but imagining a group such as Lashkar-e-Taiba or Al Qaeda in command of an entire 
nuclear arsenal would alarm any American.xxi  There is an ongoing debate between American 
and Pakistani officials over precisely how safe the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is.  The country’s 
officials defend the safety of their estimated 50 to 120 nuclear weapons while U.S. officials 
continue to push for greater safety measures.xxii  In a January 2008 interview with Newsweek, 
then-President Pervez Musharraf was asked what he thought about further American assistance 
in securing Pakistan’s arsenal. His reply seemed somewhat defensive: “We will ask if we need 
assistance. Nobody should tell us what to do.”xxiii  Pervez Hoodbhoy, chairman of the 
Department of Physics at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, put into perspective the 
security situation in Pakistan in a recent Arms Control Today issue: “In thinking how well 
Pakistan may be able to secure its nuclear weapons, materials, and experts, it is worth 
remembering that Pakistan has been unable to protect its constitution from military coups, has 
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lost half its territory [East Pakistan, now Bangladesh] in 1971, and has failed to safeguard the 
lives of its most prominent political leaders in recent months.”xxiv  These diverse views of 
Pakistan’s security indicate its complex nature.   
Several factors unique to Pakistan have added complications to its power situation and 
increased concern for the world’s nuclear safety.  These issues revolve around the precarious 
balance between the military, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and government.  Understanding 
the balance between these powers is crucial to understanding the reality of Pakistan’s nuclear 
security. These three centers of power have been struggling over control of the country for 
decades.   
Military 
Historically, the military has been the single most powerful institution in the country.xxv  
It has even been said that “while most countries have armies, Pakistan’s army has a country.”xxvi  
The military has maintained this dominance based on the insistence that the sectarian and ethnic 
divisions within the country require the strong hand of the military to ensure stability.  Since the 
1999 coup by Pervez Musharraf, the military has developed a stronger secular reputation after 
years of polarization between religious and secular schools.xxvii  Despite this development, many 
remain concerned about potential breaches of security within the army.  One expert notes, “For 
more than 25 years, the army nurtured Islamist radicals as proxy warriors for covert operations 
on Pakistan’s borders in Kashmir and Afghanistan.  This produced extremism inside parts of the 
military and intelligence. Today, some parts are at war with other parts.”xxviii   
Many have noted a growing sense of disorder within the military—a disorder linked to its 
increasing diversity.xxix  The 2008 Securing the Bomb study points out, “In at least two cases, 
serving Pakistani military officers working with al-Qaeda came within a hair’s breadth of 
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assassinating former president Musharraf.  If the military officers guarding the President cannot 
be trusted, how much confidence can the world have in the military officers guarding the nuclear 
weapons?”xxx  The military also holds singular control over the country’s nuclear facilities, 
making it that much more vulnerable to an ambush.xxxi 
As we have seen, the military has also been known to use extremists for its own 
advantage.  Over time, this has caused the tribal northern region of the country to degrade into a 
state of disorder, allowing terrorist training and ideologies to expand across the regions.  Not 
long after the Mumbai attacks, the military conceded an imposition of sharia law in the tribal 
regions of the North-West Frontier Province.  This move was declared a victory by the tribes in 
Bajaur.  To some observers, it appears the military is accommodating terrorists.xxxii  Though 
there is little evidence suggesting the military directly trained the terrorists responsible for the 
Mumbai and Lahore attacks, their freedom to train within Pakistan is the direct result of the 
privileges they have enjoyed as unofficial allies of the military.  Even still, the military has still 
not shown a wholehearted effort to uproot and exterminate Islamic radicalism, perhaps still 
intending to use these relationships for influence in the area.  But from the perspective of outside 
observers, it is difficult to tell who is using whom.xxxiii   
An explanation of the military would be incomplete without mentioning the infamous 
founder and former head of the Pakistani nuclear program, Ahmed Qadeer Khan, who sold 
nuclear secrets and technology for personal profit.  Khan’s customers included countries such as 
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and perhaps others.xxxiv  His “nuclear black market” turned over a 
huge profit from the 1980s on until his arrest in 2004.xxxv  Many U.S. experts believe this illegal 
exchange was made possible by a lack of effective government oversight, but it is hardly so 
simple.  Dr. Sharad Joshi of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies explains that 
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the “Khan network emerged at a time of political instability and corruption in Pakistan, [and] 
such an environment would once again permit conditions that would encourage proliferation.”  
This is true—but it is not insignificant to recall that this “time of political instability” lasted 
about twenty years.   
The military seems to have had a direct influence in the emergence of this nuclear 
market: Khan himself made an official statement that successive army chiefs during the 1990s 
endorsed his actions,xxxvi despite two official statements addressed to the U.S. assuring the 
opposite.xxxvii  Evidence suggests that Khan’s personal profits were known by Pakistani 
intelligence as early as 1988.  After the ISI reported this information to the military, they refused 
to act.xxxviii  In spite of the military’s dominance in the country, Pakistan’s defenses were still 
open to manipulation by a single individual, resulting in the careless selling of the world’s most 
perilous technology.   
Unfortunately, many of the details surrounding the network’s activities and business 
partners remain a mystery.  Although Pakistan’s government wishes to downplay the Khan 
controversy as a “closed chapter,” reports published in 2008 have suggested that investigations 
into the network remain incomplete.xxxix  Mark Fitzpatrick, a former U.S. nonproliferation State 
Department official, stated in 2007 that “there are undoubtedly some [members of the Khan 
network] out there, lying low and ready to resume illicit supply if the price is high enough.”xl  
This network’s existence is a reminder to the world of the dangers produced by weak control 
over nuclear programs. 
Inter-Service Intelligence 
The second side to this triangular power structure is the official intelligence agency of 
Pakistan, the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), which is notorious for waging its own personal 
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wars against Pakistani politicians and for its covert support of Taliban cells in northern Pakistan.  
Leaders of the government, such as slain former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, have described 
the ISI as “a state within a state” which works separately from the government to accomplish its 
own foreign policy goals.xli  Though the ISI has been an ally to American forces in the fight 
against Al Qaeda in northern Pakistan, it continues to use extremist jihadist militants to preserve 
its influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir.xlii  Groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba were originally 
created by the ISI.  It is strongly suspected by Washington experts that these groups still have ISI 
connections.xliii  For a country struggling to control more than forty terrorist organizations, these 
networks pose a serious problem.xliv 
The ISI was thrust back into the spotlight over its possible involvement in the November 
2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India.  Although the ISI denies any recent contact with such 
groups, most experts believe that they continue to use these militants as a “strategic asset.”xlv  
This conflict of interests has strained the relationship of American and Afghani forces.   
American officials believe that ISI agents tip off militants before scheduled missile strikes.xlvi   
For this reputation of secrecy, it has been popularly dubbed the “Invisible Soldiers Inc.”xlvii  Even 
more telling of its repute is that a third of Pakistani citizens believe that intelligence agencies 
were behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.xlviii   
Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joints Chief of Staff, has voiced the 
Obama administration’s concern about the ISI’s relationship with extremist organizations.xlix  He 
warns the ISI to not allow the Mumbai attacks to absorb all its resources, but to pursue forces 
that would destabilize Pakistan.  “They have been very attached to many of these extremist 
organizations.  In the long run, they have got to completely cut ties with those in order to really 
move in the right direction.  ISI fundamentally has to change its strategic approach… and I don’t 
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believe they can make a lot of progress until that actually occurs.”l  Sadly, without the 
cooperation of the ISI, Admiral Mullen has a difficult road ahead of him in the struggle for 
Pakistani stability. 
Government 
The assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 shocked the world.  As horrific as 
it was, it was hardly inconsistent with the messy political history of Pakistan.  A description of 
the historical violence that has plagued Pakistani politics could fill several hundred pages.  
Suffice it to say that in the case of Pakistan, through decades of coups, declarations of martial 
law, party division, and assassinations, political tumult has been more the norm than the 
exception.   
Despite her now-legendary fame and popularity, for many years Ms. Bhutto had a 
reputation for being corrupt.  Not long after her death, controversy revolving around the firing of 
several lawyers led to a threatened impeachment of long-time president and former military 
leader, Pervez Musharraf.  To avoid the shame of being forced out, Musharraf begrudgingly 
stepped down.  His replacement is the widower of Bhutto’s widower, Mr. Asif Zardari, who 
brings little hope for stability and change.  Zardari’s checkered past includes several years in 
prison on charges of corruption, and an accusation of bizarrely tying a remote-controlled bomb 
to the leg of a businessman and forcibly sending him into a bank to make a withdrawal for a pay-
off.li  He was coined “Mr. 10%” in the 1990s for his reputation of siphoning off government 
funds to add to his own fortune.  Now, as he holds power over the entire country, many popular 
newspapers have upgraded (or possibly downgraded) him to “Mr. 100%.”  Many pessimistic 
commentators predict a chaotic, brief, and disastrous presidency.lii  Less than a year into his 
watch, he has already failed to prevent such catastrophes as the massive Pakistani terrorist 
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attacks in Mumbai, India, as well as the deadly assault on Sri Lankan cricket players in Lahore, 
Pakistan.  In a span of less than five months, 180 lives have been lost from these two separate 
events. 
Public Opinion 
Along with political and economic changes, Pakistan public opinion is shifting.  President 
Zardari’s recent fiscal policies and apparent pandering to wealthy lobbyists are already the 
source of critical concern, especially with rising food prices and the rupee hitting an all-time low 
in September 2008.liii   The Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that economic policy will 
continue to focus on “crisis management” throughout 2009, along with Real GDP grown slowing 
to 1.2% in 2008/2009 from 6% in 2007/2008.liv   
According to a study conducted in June 2008 by the Center for Public Opinion (the most 
recent poll of its kind currently available), 86% of Pakistanis have been facing difficulty 
obtaining flour for their daily basic food consumption.lv  Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister 
Abdul Sattar remarked that the general feeling in Pakistan is that “the economy is declining on 
this side of the world.”lvi  This decrease in public confidence is also leading to greater 
disillusionment with the government as well as with Pakistan’s biggest Western supporter, the 
U.S.  As Pakistani citizens struggle to obtain basic nourishment, an increase in pro-Al Qaeda and 
anti-American sentiment is also on the rise.  According to the same survey, a shocking 62.9% of 
Pakistanis view America unfavorably, and 52% believe the U.S. is the most responsible for the 
violence that is occurring within Pakistan.lvii  On the other hand, there has been a rise in opinion 
regarding Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban.  Support for bin Laden has increased by 
10% since January 2008.lviii  Support for Al Qaeda has doubled from earlier in the year as well, 
most recently up to one-third.lix 
12
Global Tides, Vol. 3 [2009], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides/vol3/iss1/4
12 
The three tiers of power that control Pakistan are, at best, flawed and at worst, corrupt.  
The military serves as the most powerful institution in the country as well as the guardians of the 
state nuclear arsenal.  For this reason, it is under greater scrutiny than any of the other tiers, 
especially given its history.  The ISI continues to be both friend and foe in the fight against 
extremist militants in Kashmir and on the border of Afghanistan.  The politics of Pakistan are 
constantly in flux and hardly to be assumed stable at any given point.  With the current food 
shortage sweeping many developing parts of the globe, Pakistan is being thrown into even 
greater desperation.  As was made evident in recent elections, a majority of Pakistanis favor 
moderate parties and politics.lx However, as September 11, 2001 and the Mumbai attacks show, 
it only takes a very select and determined few to trigger large-scale terror.   
PALS: An Evolving Technology 
 Pakistan’s military, intelligence and political circumstances, in conjunction with its 
internal terrorist presence, make the country’s nuclear arsenal quite possibly the most vulnerable 
in the world—even more so than North Korea, whose government, though totalitarian, still 
maintains strong central control.  After Pakistan admitted the meeting between Al Qaeda and two 
nuclear scientists, the U.S. made a decision to increase aid to Pakistan by $100 million, 
specifically to reinforce its nuclear arsenal.lxi  However, most of this money has gone towards 
basic physical security, including surveillance systems, equipment for tracking nuclear material, 
and fencing.lxii  Despite the inflow of hundreds of millions of dollars, PAL technology has not 
been adopted for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.lxiii  Certain reports claim that Pakistan has adopted 
its own PAL technology, but these devices are shrouded in mystery.  It is likely that, if these 
devices do exist, they are not the highly effective ones of American design.lxiv  If, despite excuses 
on both American and Pakistani authorities, PAL technology were to be implemented into 
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Pakistan’s arsenal, it would virtually eliminate the chances of outside parties being able to 
successfully detonate any obtained nuclear weapon. 
 PAL technology has been developing over decades and has become highly sophisticated.  
One weapons designer put it frankly: “Bypassing a PAL should be about as complex as 
performing tonsillectomy while entering the patient from the wrong end.”lxv  There are several 
different types of PALs.  Early PAL lacked foolproof capability, and resembled a glorified 
combination lock.  The first generation consisted of simple electro-mechanical combination 
locks.lxvi   They were originally just attached to the electrical circuitry of the weapons, making 
them easy to “wire around.”lxvii  If this is the type of device Pakistan claims to have adopted, the 
security of these weapons could easily be compromised.lxviii 
More recent versions, like the “Category F” PALS, were updated to address past 
weaknesses and to include new safety measures. These PALs involve a 6 or 12-digit key which 
calculates to a total of up to one trillion possible combinations.lxix  PAL technology also involves 
a “limited try” feature.  If the individual attempting to unlock the weapon makes too many 
unsuccessful attempts, it triggers a mechanism that permanently disables the weapon.lxx  This 
technology additionally involves a tamper resistant “skin” which prevents further interference.lxxi  
These are the PALs of choice for most modern U.S. nuclear weapons, as they provide the highest 
level of security available.  Modern PAL technology is integral to the weapon, which could 
admittedly make it more difficult to adopt for Pakistan’s weapons—but, according to experts, not 
impossible.lxxii  These technical improvements have created nearly insurmountable odds for any 
unauthorized people who might attempt to set off a nuclear bomb.   
Differing Opinions 
 Though there are certainly disagreements between the U.S. and Pakistan on sharing PAL 
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technology, there are also differing opinions within the countries themselves.  In order to 
discover the best possible solution to this complex issue, a thorough exploration of the points of 
view must be made.   
 Many politicians, intelligence officers, statesmen, and experts support the sharing of PAL 
technology, and this support seems to have increased as Pakistan’s security continues to be of 
growing concern to the world.  With the recent assassination of Benazir Bhutto, many experts 
worry that further violence will inevitably throw the government into anarchy and cause nuclear 
weapons security to be compromised by radicals.lxxiii  As extremism rises, so does the concern 
for top officials such as President Zardari and General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani: if these leaders are 
taken captive or killed, the country’s nuclear arsenal would be made vulnerable.  However, PAL 
technology would ensure that even under such circumstances, nuclear weapons could not be set 
off without proper authorization.   
 Another cause for greater weapon security comes from the historic and ongoing hostility 
between Pakistan and India.  Based upon extreme religious ideologies, anti-Indian radicals could 
potentially use nuclear weapons as a way to trigger violence and mayhem between the two 
countries.  It is an understatement to describe a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India as 
a calamity of global proportions.  Both countries contain cities with very densely populated 
cities.  India’s Mumbai is the second largest city in the world with a staggering 13.9 million 
people.lxxiv  Pakistan’s Karachi is third with 12.8 million people.lxxv  A single bomb dropped on 
any of these populated areas would be catastrophic.  
 Anti-Indian groups are not the only concern. Other terrorists groups, such as Al Qaeda, 
would also be prevented from using Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the event that they were to be 
stolen.lxxvi  Despite substantial American financial assistance in securing against such dangers, 
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Pakistan still faces huge threats from armed jihadi groups and nuclear insiders that have shown 
willingness to sell sensitive technology.lxxvii  These same insiders could not be trusted to refrain 
from assisting such groups from overthrowing nuclear facilities.  An even more likely scenario is 
that in the event of a crisis between Pakistan and India, a military commander could potentially 
order the use of nuclear weapons on his own independent authority.lxxviii   Without the safety 
which PALs provide, such a threat would intensify Indian concerns. 
Indirect threats can also appear if high-security military targets are attacked and nuclear 
program technicians and scientists are apprehended by terrorists.  This would allow for the 
kidnappers to learn of vulnerabilities in the system from the perspective of an insider.  Three 
recent kidnapping incidents have involved nuclear program personnel of the Pakistan Atomic 
Energy Commission (PAEC).  In 2006, two PAEC scientists were kidnapped by the Taliban in 
the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).  The second incident was in January 2007 when the 
Taliban failed at an attempt to kidnap six PAEC scientists and take them to their headquarters in 
Waziristan.lxxix  One was in February 2008, when two PAEC technicians were kidnapped by 
armed men, also in the NWFP.lxxx  As Dr. Joshi notes, “While such groups might not have the 
intention to acquire nuclear/radiological materials or attack nuclear facilities due to the technical 
challenges involved, intentions and strategies can change in potential opportunities present 
themselves.”lxxxi  However, if Pakistan’s weapons were equipped with PAL technology, any 
information gained from kidnapped personnel would be useless even in the event of a terrorist 
takeover of a nuclear weapons facility.  
 The final reason the U.S. should choose to support Pakistani adoption of PAL technology 
would be for diplomatic reasons.  Although U.S.-Pakistan relations are positive overall, there has 
undeniably been recent friction.  As Musharraf stepped down from the presidency, the U.S. lost 
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one of its closest allies in the region.  Rising violence on the Afghan border is causing grievances 
on both Pakistani and American ends.  Americans accuse Pakistan of being reluctant to 
completely commit itself to fighting militants in its territory.  In turn, Pakistanis accuse U.S. 
forces of overstepping their bounds with recent unilateral attacks against militants.lxxxii  This is 
seen by Pakistanis as a threat to their sovereignty and has led to growing animosity towards 
perceived American interference. 
 In spite of the benefits of increased weapon security, some Americans believe PAL 
technology should not be shared, and they base their claims on three arguments.  The first 
revolves around the legality of sharing such information and technology.  The second is that with 
PAL technology, nuclear weapons will be more likely to be deployed in moments of heightened 
tension, which could ultimately lead to a better chance of a nuclear war between Pakistan and 
India. The third view argues that sharing such information would have the undesirable effect of 
teaching Pakistan too much about American weaponry.lxxxiii   
 The first question to address is the legality of sharing PAL information.  Those critical of 
sharing PAL technology often point to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  Article I of the NPT 
forbids signatories “to assist, encourage, or induce any nonnuclear weapon state to manufacture, 
or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons of 
explosive devices.”  It is important to note that Article I refers to nonnuclear states.  Under the 
NPT, Pakistan is legally considered a “nonnuclear” state, as it is not a signatory.lxxxiv   
 The Atomic Energy Act (AEA), or McMahon Act as it is commonly called, is also 
referenced as a legal concern.  This Act originally went into effect in 1946 as an effort to 
maintain America’s world monopoly on nuclear weapons.lxxxv  Clearly it was not as effective as 
was hoped, and improvements were later made through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 
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(NNPA) of 1978.  The McMahon Act forbids any sharing of nuclear secrets with foreign powers 
on penalty of death.  This was maintained within the NNPA.lxxxvi  Some critics of sharing PAL 
technology point to the grave language of this Act.  Of course, this depends upon the definition 
of “sharing nuclear secrets.” 
Another requirement that carried over from the AEA to the NNPA was for an Agreement 
for Cooperation to be signed when the U.S. makes any significant nuclear trade.lxxxvii  In addition 
to this, a nuclear proliferation statement (NPAS) must be provided by the Secretary of State to 
the President.  This statement would evaluate several specifications regarding the agreement, 
including proof and assurance that the assistance furnished would in no way further military or 
nuclear explosive purpose.  Some experts consider this to rule out the possibility of sharing PAL 
technology, as it could theoretically serve to further military or nuclear purposes.lxxxviii  
The final possible legal barrier lies in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which is 
described as “a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to contribute to the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of Guidelines for nuclear exports 
and nuclear related exports.”lxxxix  One of the requirements the NSG makes of potential 
technology recipient countries is to have full IAEA safeguards met.  Pakistan, however, does not 
meet this condition.xc 
 Aside from legal concerns, skeptics also point to the potential impacts PAL technology 
could have on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.  Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are, at present, unable to 
be immediately deployed as they are kept in what former President Musharraf has described as a 
“disassembled state.”xci  The adoption of PAL technology could potentially cause military 
leaders to change this strategy. The fear is that adoption of PALs would encourage the military to 
bring the bombs into an assembled state, which some say could undesirably increase the 
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Pakistan’s ability to deploy their weapons more regularly.  In the extreme view, this could lead to 
a higher chance of nuclear war, particularly with India.xcii 
 Beyond issues of law, critics also point to the vulnerabilities that the U.S. itself may have 
to risk in the exchange of nuclear information.  If an exchange of information and technology 
does occur, there is a concern that Pakistan will learn too much about American weaponry and 
safety technologies.  Before September 11, 2001, there was frustration on the part of Pakistan 
and India for American’s supposed concern for their nuclear situation.  They argued that this 
concern was “not reflected in the American denial of technology cooperation with India and 
Pakistan on safety and security measures—especially those that involve interaction among 
scientists and sale of equipment related to nuclear safety.”xciii  Post-September 11th policies have 
improved in this regard, with increased cooperation and support towards Pakistan’s nuclear 
security.  Still, U.S. officials remain reluctant to allow certain safety technologies to be shared. 
 There is debate within Pakistan about the adoption of PAL technology as well.  Some 
argue in favor of adoption, citing the increased security and incentives it could mean, but 
politicians and scientists that remain critical of a PAL technology exchange are concerned 
mainly with information exchange issues as well as the belief that such securities are superfluous 
and unnecessary.   
   Those who support the technology transfer refer to the obvious reasoning that PALs 
would increase the security of Pakistan’s arsenal.  With PAL technology, nuclear weapons would 
be more secure from unauthorized use.  Critics of the military within Pakistan cite recent failures 
by the military to maintain control over their personnel at the same time as fighting off increased 
attacks and suicide bombings.xciv  This increased security would guard from those apparent 
threats, namely the possibility of unauthorized use, access to terrorists, and breakdown in civilian 
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control.  Another motivation for this technology exchange is an increase in US-Pakistan relations 
and a possible increase in U.S. financial incentives.  With the current economic and food crises 
occurring in Pakistan, the continuance of U.S. financial support is becoming even more 
important.  
 In congruence with U.S. security concerns, Pakistani military officials are also concerned 
with the vulnerability that may occur during information exchange.  According to Brigadier 
Feroz Hassan Khan, the installation of PALs would require information that he believes “in no 
way any country will share.”xcv  Such information would include particulars regarding its nuclear 
weapons design and system functioning details.   
 Lastly, Pakistan argues that PAL technology is superfluous to its arsenal.  Musharraf 
claimed that Pakistani nuclear weapons are protected by the best systems in the world.  In an 
interview with Newsweek in January of 2008, he stated that  
there is a national command authority. It is the top body, headed by the president 
and the prime minister, and there are members from the military and the civilian 
side. And there's a huge strategic planning division, a full secretariat headed by 
now-retired [Lt. General Khalid] Kidwai. He is in charge of this Strategic 
Planning Division that is the secretarial arm of the National Command, 
responsible for development and employment. Then we have army, navy, air 
force, the strategic force command. If anything happens, indeed it's a failure of 
everyone from myself to SPD to the Army Strategic Force Command.xcvi   
Unfortunately, each of these lines of defense mentioned by General Musharraf has weaknesses. 
 Even from the most optimistic point of view—that Pakistan’s military currently has 
complete control of its nuclear arsenal—it remains true that PAL technology would add yet 
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another line of defense for an arsenal surrounded by ever-changing threats.  The legal concerns 
described by U.S. officials have long been the single greatest argument against PAL adoption for 
Pakistan.   
 The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), being a multilateral treaty, does present some 
particular difficulties.  It cannot be amended like domestic legislation, since it involves the 
agreement of several sovereign states.  However, the NPT’s forbiddance for signatories to assist 
non-nuclear states to “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons” does not necessarily 
apply directly to security technology on pre-existing nuclear weapons.  Such technology could be 
categorized under the “otherwise acquire” language.  According to Gregory Giles of the Science 
Applications International Corporation, such a “violation” could be considered merely a breach 
of the “spirit” of the NPT.xcvii  This vague violation would likely be successfully argued against 
in international court if indeed it came to it.   
 Despite the NPT, there have been occurrences of the U.S. sharing technology to enhance 
the security of foreign nuclear weapons.xcviii  The best-known exchange involved the U.S. 
helping the French military to improve the safety of its nuclear weapons, which was at the time 
of disclosure considered to be “perhaps the best-kept secret in recent Washington history.”xcix  To 
work around NPT rules, U.S. officials developed a system termed “negative guidance” or “20 
questions.”  By listening to French descriptions of the country’s research programs, the U.S. was 
able to give guidance by indicating whether or not they were “on the right track.”c  The legality 
of this exchange was defended repeatedly.  White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater defended 
the arrangement as “entirely consistent” with the laws of both nations.ci   
 This particular history demonstrates two things about current proliferation law.  First, it 
shows a legal precedent of technology sharing between the U.S. and an ally when it specifically 
21
McDermott: PALs for Pals: The U.S. and Pakistan
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2009
21 
involves the security of a nation’s nuclear arsenal, and legal precedent is upheld in domestic U.S. 
law.  More importantly, however, it shows the inefficient maneuvering that must be undergone to 
share weapons safety technology both as a result and in spite of outdated legislation.  If a law 
becomes less of a barrier and more of an obstacle to be creatively circumvented, then evidently, 
it is outdated and senseless.  
 International practice shows that, as a rule, domestic legislation trumps international 
law.cii  Even if the NPT were unable to be circumvented in order to share PAL information, an 
amendment to domestic legislation would overrule the NPT.  This is not unprecedented, since the 
existence of the NNPA is in effect an amendment on the McMahon Act.  It is only logical that 
legislation regarding nuclear weapons should evolve over time as different threats change over 
time.  Laws written in response to Cold War circumstances cannot be expected to translate 
perfectly to the circumstances the world faces today.  Pakistan faces modern threats impacting 
the entire international community.  Such a reality should be reflected in U.S. legislation 
regarding nuclear weapons.  Harold M. Agnew of the Los Alamos Weapons Lab stated, 
“Lawyers say it’s classified.  That’s nonsense.  We should share this technology.  Anybody who 
joins the club should be helped to get this.”ciii  Even after legal issues have been circumvented, 
however, there are still other concerns that have been voiced. 
The next issue to consider is the fear that weapons are more likely to be deployed after 
the adoption of PALs.  This concern is merely speculative.  Pakistani officials such as General 
Kidwai have repeatedly reiterated their determination to stick to “rational decision-making” to 
ensure that both countries keep away from the nuclear brink.  It is true that animosity towards 
India has been constant for many years, but despite this, there have been no discussions covering 
the possible consequences of an attack on India, based on a mutual determination to avoid such 
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circumstances, especially as both sides would have much to lose in a nuclear exchange.civ   Even 
if Pakistan was determined to use its nuclear arsenal, its present “disassembled” state would not 
prevent rapid deployment.  Indeed, General Kidwai stated that the bombs could be assembled 
“very quickly, which suggests that PAL technology would have little impact on the speed of 
deployment.”cv  The real danger does not come from official orders to bomb India but from 
terrorist plots and breakdown in military or civil control. 
 A third and last set of opinions to address are the American and Pakistani apprehensions 
regarding the vulnerability of information exchange.  It cannot be denied that the details of a 
state’s nuclear program are understandably its most closely guarded secrets.  Even the closest of 
allies would consider it to be hypersensitive information.  For the growing security concerns in 
Pakistan, an extra effort should be made to find a way to share this technology.  The tactics 
adopted to work around legal stipulations in the 1989 French example should be modified to 
work around sensitive information concerns between Pakistan and the U.S.  However, more 
wide-reaching actions must be taken to create a long-term solution which would allow nuclear 
states to adopt the safety technologies that they require. 
These difficult circumstances shed light on the necessity for a more complete reform.  If 
indeed the chance of nuclear terrorist attacks is increasing over time, as Senator Lugar’s report 
claims, then swift reform is needed.  Both legislation and international treaties are notoriously 
time-consuming when it comes to nuclear weapons and proliferation issues.  With violent 
episodes continuing and increasing, both by domestic groups within Pakistan and by Pakistan-
based terrorist groups in places such as Mumbai, long-winded debate over legislation may end 
up being a deadly waste of time.   
In the case that Congress lacks the expediency needed to make these quick changes in 
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current proliferation law, the IAEA should instead be granted more power.  The IAEA works as 
a nonbiased international organization to “promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear 
technologies.”cvi  By expanding the powers of the IAEA, a safety-technology-sharing program 
could be set in place, making it possible to ensure all nuclear weapons are fitted with appropriate 
safety technology such as PALs.  With this new program, the technical transfer process of the 
NSG would conceivably become more adaptable as well, since the two bodies already work 
together in this field.  
Despite its potential, the IAEA historically has been a well-meaning, but weak force in 
the fight for nonproliferation.  Director-General Mohamed El Baradei stated in 2005, “We are 
limited in authority. We have a very modest budget. And we have no armies. But armed with the 
strength of our convictions, we will continue to speak truth to power.”cvii  Sadly, simple words 
will do little good in securing nuclear weapons or preventing proliferation.  These are some of 
the reasons that President Obama presented while campaigning in 2008 when he took a platform 
to support the increase in budget for the IAEA.  As Matthew Bunn points out, nuclear safety 
requires constant vigilance if global nuclear security is to be someday maintained.  However, 
many of the factors involved in this endeavor are simply not within the control of Washington.  
With increased authority, the IAEA could work as an international independent and nonbiased 
party, making it more likely for nuclear states to participate and comply.  International 
cooperation is vital.cviii 
PAL Potential 
 Pakistani adoption of PAL technology could have several positive direct and indirect 
impacts.  Increasing the security of Pakistan’s arsenal would certainly translate into increased 
security for the US, Asia, and the world at large.  Pakistan is often considered to be the least 
24
Global Tides, Vol. 3 [2009], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides/vol3/iss1/4
24 
secure of the nuclear states, rivaled only by North Korea.  Despite the government and military’s 
insistence that its security is impenetrable, the country’s violent history has led to serious doubts 
about this claim.  As John E. McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the CIA pointed out, “I am 
confident of two things: that the Pakistanis are very serious about securing this material, but also 
that someone in Pakistan is very intent on getting their hands on it.”cix  Pakistan can do what it 
thinks is adequate in order to ensure the security of its nuclear weapons, but the present technical 
precautions are “only as good as the men who operate them.”cx  The security which PALs would 
contribute to nuclear safety could make up for any shortcomings in internal personnel safety.  
Even if terrorists or other extremists were to gain access to the weapons, any amount of 
tampering would have the effect of immediately and permanently disabling them.  
Another positive consequence of Pakistani PAL implementation would be to encourage 
India to also adopt them.  Since the day India detonated its first nuclear bomb, the two countries 
have been competing in an arms race, and it is conceivable that the race could work in the 
reverse as well—towards a safer nuclear situation in the region.  There is proof of this in a 
statement by General Kidwai, who claimed that if India renounces the possession of nuclear 
weapons, Pakistan would follow suit.  Therefore, it is feasible that security measures successfully 
adopted by Pakistan could also be adopted by India. 
Lastly, PAL adoption for Pakistan would be a positive result of years of U.S. investment.  
As of June 2008, the U.S. government had provided Pakistan’s military with more than $10 
billion since 2001.cxi  This transfer of technology would be a great accomplishment for U.S.-
Pakistani relations and an indication of cooperation between the two countries.  It would prove to 
U.S. taxpayers that Islamabad does not consider its alliance with the U.S. as a guarantee of 
preferential treatment or a reason to ignore American counsel.cxii  Successful adoption on the part 
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of Pakistan would indicate positive Pakistani cooperation and would allow for greater 
concentration on the ongoing fight against extremists in the Tribal regions. 
As proliferation expert Scott Sagan observed, the world’s trend towards proliferation 
means a world where a nuclear accident is inevitable.cxiii  Pakistan in particular remains an 
“unsettled and unsettling political phenomenon.”cxiv  The instability of its military, intelligence, 
and government are of real concern to the world’s safety.  The fact that Al Qaeda continues to 
use this nuclear state as its safe-haven is not an issue of minor concern.  Of course it is an 
exaggeration to portray Pakistan’s weapons as completely unprotected, as Generals Musharraf 
and Kidwai have repeatedly insisted.  However, history has proven time and again that the 
unexpected is to be expected in Pakistan.  
Seven years after the attacks of September 11th, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda have yet 
to be brought to justice.  They have continued their organizing and plotting over the years, first 
in Afghanistan and now in Pakistan.  Though specifics revolving their plots may be limited, it is 
plain that they are not idle.  They have shown interest in obtaining nuclear materials in the past, 
and there is no reason to assume they have given up.  With everything that can be seen from 
Pakistan’s unstable history, the U.S. is obligated to do everything within its power to keep 
nuclear weapons out of the grasp of its enemies.  PAL technology would ensure that, in the event 
of any disasters in Pakistan, there would be little-to-no possibility of nuclear attack on U.S. soil.  
PALs may just be the one tool that keeps our modern civilization from ever becoming a 
“smoking ruin.”cxv  It is time to tell Pakistan that “trust us” is simply not enough.cxvi 
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